We use an economic learning model to examine how knowledge parameters characterizing a sourcing relationship between a vendor and a client interact with production costs and coordination costs to affect the business value of alternative outsourcing strategies. This information is then used to determine a firm's optimal rate of information technology (IT) outsourcing. We find that the optimal outsourcing rate is dependent on the ability of the outsourcing client to acquire production knowledge from its outsourcing vendor and to retain its internal coordination knowledge despite losses of fundamental production skills due to outsourcing. Specifically, when the client is unable to acquire sufficient production knowledge from the external vendor, the client's optimal outsourcing decision is to engage in either one of two extreme strategies--total insourcing or total outsourcing--depending on the rate at which the client's coordination knowledge depreciates. On the other hand, when the client is able to acquire a substantial amount of production knowledge from the external vendor, the firm's optimal decision is to outsource only a portion of its IT services, where the proportion depends on the rate at which the client's coordination knowledge depreciates.
We use a duopoly model of quality--price competition between a software innovator and an imitator to determine the socially optimal software patent policy and to assess the social welfare implications of alternative patent policies. We find that the optimal patent policy is to grant patent protection for the entire life of the innovative software product (i.e., set infinite patent length) and to set the novelty and nonobviousness requirement for attaining a patent (i.e., patent height) and the scope of patent protection (i.e., patent width) such that both the innovator and imitator produce higher-quality products than they would in the free market. This policy not only maximizes social welfare but also makes the innovator, imitator, and consumers better off than in the free market. However, counter to intuition, we find that firms exhibit lower research and development intensity under the socially optimal patent policy than they do under free market competition. While highly stylized, the model offers a useful framework within which researchers and regulators can think about the economic trade-offs among three patent policy parameters (length, height, and width) simultaneously.
In this paper, we present an economic learning model that helps to formalize the complex relationships among an offshoring firm's knowledge levels, production costs, and coordination costs. Specifically, we model a domestic firm's use of a selective offshore strategy (i.e., offshoring only a portion of its information technology activities) to exploit, through IT investments or contractual provisions, the foreign vendor's large, scale-driven repository of production knowledge. We illustrate the conditions under which knowledge transfers during offshoring may reduce a domestic firm's in-house production costs, leading to total cost savings in both the short term and the long term. Alternatively, when knowledge transfers are not sufficiently large, some short-lived offshoring projects may generate substantial cost savings to the domestic firm; however, long-lived offshoring projects may cause a disruption in the knowledge supply chain, resulting in substantial losses in the later stages of the project. A firm that fails to realize the costs associated with such a disruption soon enough in the project life may find itself locked into a disadvantageous offshoring agreement without any recourse. However, a domestic firm may be able to overcome a disruption in its knowledge supply chain by exploiting the learning-by-doing production knowledge generated by the foreign vendor's economies of scale. The managerial implications derived from our learning model may help guide firms as they consider the impacts of offshore contracts and knowledge management investments on firm knowledge, production costs, and coordination costs.
We use an economic model to formalize the complex relationships among IT investments, intermediate performance measures (e.g., product quality and output levels), and economic performance (e.g., productivity, profits, and consumer surplus). We demonstrate that a profit-maximizing monopolist invests in IT (modeled as changes in parametric characteristics of the firm) to design a better-quality product and charge a higher price. While this profit-maximizing adjustment generates more consumer surplus, it also increases production costs in a way that adversely affects productivity. In contrast, a simple model extension shows that when a firm is unwilling or unable to improve product quality, then IT investments result in suboptimal improvements in profits, an increase in consumer surplus, and an increase in productivity. Together, these models highlight the way in which product quality moderates the relationship between IT investments and economic performance. We also demonstrate that these relationships are robust to the socially optimal case in which a social planner chooses price and quality to maximize social welfare. In addition, we demonstrate that the results of the monopoly model hold when considering the design and development of products offered free of charge (e.g., free online content), but that provide indirect benefits to the firm (e.g., more advertising revenues).
This paper develops a series of two-stage duopoly models of quality-price competition and a series of monopoly models of quality-price choice in order to examine the impact of information technology (IT) investments on firm profit, firm productivity, and consumer welfare. We solve the duopoly and monopoly models for four cost functions, where each function makes a different assumption about the form of the marginal cost of production. These models are used to conduct a two-by-four comparison [(monopoly, duopoly) x (four cost functions)] of the impact of IT investments on economic performance. The analysis reveals that together market structure and cost structure play a critical role in determining the form of the relationship between IT investment and economic measures. Specifically, moving from monopoly to duopoly and moving from zero marginal cost to marginal cost as a function of quality increase the number of economic measures for which the directional effects of IT investment are ambiguous, or depend on model parameter values.